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VIOLENCE AND THE PRIVATE: A GIRARDIAN MODEL OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY
BRIAN R. DECKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Brett Myers punched his wife in the face.1 That's what the
Philadelphia Phillies' ace pitcher's wife told police in June 2006. When the
club was visiting Boston for interleague play, the couple was walking back
to their hotel from a bar when they started arguing. 2 Kim Myers said Brett,
who is a foot taller than Kim and twice as heavy, "hit her in the face twice
with his fist.', 3 According to witnesses, while Kim was cowering on the
ground, Brett slapped her and attempted to drag her to her feet by her shirt
4 ,5and hair.4 She cried out, "I'm not going to let you do this to me anymore.
When police arrived, she was crying and her face was swollen. The district
attorney arraigned Brett on assault and battery charges, 6 but he was released
and went on to start against the Red Sox the next day.7 Three months later,
the court dismissed the case when Kim asked that the charges be dropped. 8
Boston Municipal Court Judge Raymond Dougan reasoned that, "domestic
violence allegations are difficult for prosecutors to prove because they
involve private relationships."9 Brett expressed some semblance of regret,
but not for the violence: "I'm sorry that it had to get public." '
0
The Myers domestic-violence case, though notable for its press
coverage and the notoriety of its defendant, is not unusual. Statistics
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7 Richard Justice, Caveman Era Never End in Baseball, HOUSTON CHIRON., June
27, 2006, Sports, at 1.
8 April Simpson, Charge Against Pitcher Dismissed: WiJe Asked that Court Drop
Case Against Myers, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 2006, at B 1.
9Id.
10 Justice, supra note 7.
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identify women as the majority of victims of domestic violence, accounting
for the victims of approximately 84 percent of incidents of domestic
spousal violence." Of the 3.5 million incidents of violence against a family
member in the United States each year, fewer than 60 percent are reported
to police;12 fewer than 36 percent of those result in an arrest. 13 Over 7
percent of those charged do not ultimately face adjudication,1 4 while fewer
than half of those who do are convicted of a felony. 15
America has a long history of treating domestic violence differently
from public violence. 16  From the nation's founding through the mid-
nineteenth century, domestic violence jurisprudence was shaped by the
common-law prerogative of chastisement, which allowed a husband to
assault his wife within certain "reasonable" limitations. 17 Though formal
recognition of chastisement faded, twentieth-century jurisprudence
nonetheless replaced it with justifications centered on the concept of
privacy for avoiding enforcement of civil and criminal penalties in
intramarital disputes. 18 Despite the historical tendency of jurisprudence to
employ mild, if any. punishment, recent statistics suggest that enforcement
of criminal penalties against perpetrators of domestic violence may be on
11 BUREAU O1 JUSTICE SI'AI'ICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING
STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES I ("Females were 84% of spouse
abuse victims and 86% of victims of abuse at the hands of a boyfriend or girlfriend [in
2005].").12 Id. at 22 tbl.4. 1.
1" Id. at 28 tbl.4.7.
14 Compare id. at 45 tbl.6.1 (493 defendants in family-assault cases in eleven
large counties in 2000) with id. at 49 tbl.6.11 (457 of those defendants ultimately reached
adjudication).
15 See id. at 49 & tbl.6.13 ("The probability of being convicted of a felony was
about... 48.1% .... ").
"6 See generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing how the history of
chastisement in America has negatively affected the way the legal system deals with
modem domestic violence).
7ee eid. at 2123 25 ("As master of his household, a husband could command
his wife's obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or 'chastisement' if she
defied his authority.").
"s See id. at 2165 71 (discussing cases that provided a marital-privacy rationale
for failure to enforce wives' tort and contract claims against their husbands and for failure
to resolve disputes through the criminal justice system); cf Hynson v. City of Chester,
Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that differential police
treatment of domestic and public violence does not constitute a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause "absent a showing of al intent, purpose
or effect of discriminating against women").
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par with or even exceed criminal enforcement in cases of public violence.19
Yet, as episodes like that of Brett and Kim Myers demonstrate, echoes of
that history can still be heard in today's legal system. Questions
surrounding how domestic violence differs from public violence and why it
might demand different legal treatment remain relevant.
Ren6 Girard, a French religious anthropologist, argues in his 1972
work, Violence and the Sacred, that violence is an inevitable element of
20society. Violence exists, and once aroused it threatens to snowball
throughout society and cause chaos. 21 In Girard's theory, society uses ritual
to alleviate this violence on the theory that violence can be channeled into a
sacrificial victim that, by being destroyed, can both provide an outlet for
violence and restore social order.22  Some legal scholars have found
Girard's framework helpful for understanding treatments of violence in the
law, particularly with respect to capital punishment, 23 but it seems no one
has seriously considered its implications for the problem of domestic
violence.
The American legal system has historically been unwilling to
heavily penalize domestic violence-private violence-because, as I shall
demonstrate, it has tacitly viewed victims of such violence as sacrifices
providing an outlet against public violence. This article will explore the
link between the Girardian model of sacrifice and the American legal
system's historical treatment of domestic violence. In Part I, I will discuss
the evolution of that treatment, looking at examples in the criminal justice
system from police and courts. In Part I1, I will turn to the Girardian
sacrifice structure as a descriptive model of this domestic-violence
tolerance, incorporating ideas from other ritual anthropologists. Finally, in
19 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 49 tbl.6.11.
'o See RENE GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 2-4 (Patrick Gregory trans.,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1977) (1972).
21 See id. at 14 15 ("Every time [violence] turns up in some part of the
community, it threatens to involve the whole social body.").
22 See id. at 8.
23 See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to Do With It?
The Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487, 525-35
(1997); Donald L. Beschle, Why Do People Support Capital Punishment? The Death
Penalty as Community Ritual, 33 CONN. L. REv. 765, 777 88 (2001); Roberta M.
Harding, Capital Punishment as Human Sacrifice. A Societal Ritual as Depicted in
George Eliot's Adam Bede, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 175, 190-208 (2000); see also James
McBride, Revisiting a Seminal Text of the Law and Literature Movement: A Girardian
Reading of Herman Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor, 3 MARGINS 285, 314-18 (2003)
(reading Billy Budd as a Girardian condemnation of the law for the use of an innocent
victim as a scapegoat).
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Part IV, I will explain how this new understanding can inform feminist
theories of domestic violence and a practical understanding of the public-
private relationship.
II. TOLERATING DOMESTIC V1OLENCE
Until the late nineteenth century, chastisement was the dominant
common-law rule governing violence between a husband and wife.24
Generally, the law did not permit marital violence. But a husband was
"master of the household" and his wife "obliged to obey." 25 The husband
and wife constituted one legal unit; in civil and criminal courts they were
answerable as the same person. 26 Blackstone explains that, as a logical
consequence of this legal structure, "[tihe husband ... might give his wife
moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law
thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by
domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to
correct his apprentices or children .... 27
American courts were willing to recognize chastisement as a defense
for battery or as an upper limit on a husband beating his wife. In Bradley v.
State, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reasoned that a judicial
investigation of "[flamily broils and dissentions . .. [would] cast[] a shade
over the character of those who are unfortunately engaged in the
controversy. . . . [L]et the husband be permitted to exercise the right of
moderate chastisement .... ,8 In 1852, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina ruled that a beaten wife who did not suffer "a lasting injury or
great bodily harm" could not stand witness against her husband's assault.
29
Chastisement was not limited to the South; in 1857, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that a husband's use of force did not necessarily entitle
his wife to a divorce:
A man ... has a right to a reasonable control of [his wife's]
actions, as he is accountable, in many respects, for her
24 See Siegal, supra note 16, at 2118 ("The Anglo-American common law
provided that a husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal
punishment or 'chastisement' so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.").
" Id. at 2122-23.
26 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 ("By marriage, the
husband and wife are one person in law...
271 d. at *432.
21 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824).
29 State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Bush.) 123, 127 (1852) (per curiam).
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conduct. It is a sickly sensibility which holds that a man may
not lay hands on his wife, even rudely, if necessary, to
prevent the commission of some unlawful or criminal
purpose, or the use of a butchers-knife against a relative;
some allowance should be made for the frailties of human
nature; a man may sometimes, on sudden impulse, be
betrayed into the commission of an act, or a harsh expression,
for which, in a moment after, he might be repentant and
sorrowful. 3°
By the end of the nineteenth century, state courts had almost universally
rejected the formal chastisement rule.3 1 In 1893, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi announced that Bradley's "blind adherence . . . to revolting
precedent has long been utterly repudiated in the administration of criminal
law in our courts. ' 2
The twentieth century did not destroy the assumptions underlying
the chastisement doctrine; it merely transferred them to subtler practices.
Cases such as the Third Circuit's Hynson v. City of Chester33 and Brown v.
Grabowski34 made clear that the American justice system remained willing
to treat domestic violence as a private matter, sufficiently different from
public violence to justify special legal treatment. In Hynson, the mother
and children of a woman killed by domestic violence filed a Section 1983
action claiming that police officers violated the decedent's equal-protection
rights by ignoring her earlier complaints. 35 The Third Circuit held that,
even in light of evidence of a police policy of treating domestic violence
cases differently from public violence, the plaintiffs could not prevail
absent a showing that a motivating factor behind the policy was gender-
based discrimination. 36 Under similar facts in Brown, the court held that,
despite the district court's finding of "a municipal plan or policy evincing
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of domestic violence
victims., 37 domestic violence victims were not necessarily entitled to the
30 Richards v. Richards, I Grant 389, 392 93 (Pa. 1857).
31 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 2129-30 ("[B]y the late 1870's, there was no
judge or treatise writer in the U.S. who recognized a husband's prerogative to chastise his
wife.").
32 Harris v. State, 14 So. 266, 266 (Miss. 1893).
33 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).
34 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990).
" 864 F.2d at 1029.
31 Id. at 1031.
37 922 F.2d at 1105.
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recovery of damages. Because of the dearth of scholarship or case law on
the equal protection rights of domestic violence victims at the time of the
events in Brown, the victim's right to equal protection had not been "clearly
established and clear in its contours."
38
The policies at issue in Hynson and Brown, like the old chastisement
rule, are the result of belief in what Katherine O'Donovan has called "a
private domain of subjectivity, morality and the personal [that is] 'not the
law's business' [and leads] to non-intervention in domestic life. "
39
Donileen Loseke and Richard Gelles suggest that the result of such a view
is "experiences with family violence [being] 'swept under the carpet'
because they are 'private family matters."' 40  Jennifer Koshan details a
model of political assumptions that was operative in Canada's past
treatment of domestic violence and that could explain the bizarre outcomes
of cases like Kim Myers's:
While it may have been possible to prove a charge of intimate
assault other than through a wife's testimony, the
enforcement of the law by the police, prosecution, and the
courts was low level and erratic. When police did respond to
"domestics," they often attempted to reconcile the parties, and
they rarely laid charges .. . . Such 'inaction' was justified
ideologically by the state on the basis of preserving family
unity and stability. Thus, the law has been implicated as
31Id. at 1118-19.
39 KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN THE LAW 11 (1985). Though
this paper is confined to the United States, the problems that the legal concept of the
private presents for female victims of domestic violence occur all over the world. See
Hilary Charlesworth, Worlds Apart. Public/Private Distinctions in International Law, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 243, 254-55 (Margaret Thornton ed.,
1995) (arguing that international law, in dealing with public violence involving the state,
has neglected the human-rights issue of private violence against women); see also
CATHARINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DIALOGLES 276-77 (2006) (postulating that international human-rights law may have
been wary of confronting domestic violence because of the complexities entailed in its
private nature).
40 Donileen R. Loseke & Richard J. Gelles, Examining and Evaluating
Controversies on Family Violence, Introduction to CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, at x (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); cf
Donileen R. Loseke et al., Understanding Controversies on Family Violence,
Introduction to CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, at xi (Donileen R.
Loseke et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) ("Attempts to generate concern for the formerly defined
'private troubles' of family violence did not immediately galvanize an unaware public
and apathetic public policy system.").
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playing a fundamental role in maintaining the boundary
between public and private in the area of intimate violence
against women.
4 1
III. GIRARD AND VIOLENCE AS A CONTAINER
The fundamental feminist critique of legal regime regarding the
dichotomous nature of public and private violence is based in the discrepant
outcomes it affords men and women. In Toward a Feminist Theory of the
State, Catharine MacKinnon argues that "[t]he law of privacy treats the
private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women,
the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither
free nor particularly personal. 42
Feminists have argued that men perpetuate this public-private divide
because they are not the ones who suffer under it. MacKinnon, for
instance, contends that "[m]en's realm of private freedom is women's realm
of collective subordination. " 43 Robin West makes this discrepancy even
clearer: "[p]rotecting the privacy and freedom of individuals to do and say
as we wish in our private, intimate lives frees men to oppress, abuse,
exploit or, in the extreme, to rape, and thereby further weaken women."
44
MacKinnon and West are keen to discern why men might not care or notice
how the barrier between a public sphere, where violence is banned, and a
private sphere, where violence is to some extent permitted, disfavors
women. Both critiques fall short, however, of explaining why men, and by
extension male-run society, might erect and preserve this barrier between
private and public spheres.
Here it is useful to examine conceptions of violence from outside the
feminist-legal literature. French sociological thought provides a rich
exploration of the meanings of violence in society. In particular, the work
of Rend Girard constructs a model of ritualistic violence from a
sociological-religious perspective that suggests reasons why male-run
41 Jennifer Koshan, Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence,
and Aboriginal Women, in CHALLENGING I'HE PUBLIC/PRIVAIE DIVIDE: FEMINISM,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 87, 90 (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997); see also Michele Madden
Dempsey, What Counts as Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis, 12 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 301, 312 (2006) (providing an overview of the implications of domestic
violence's location in the "private" home).
42 CATIIARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST TIIEORY OF TIlE STATE
168 (1989).
43 id.
44 Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 462 (1992).
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society would permit and preserve a distinct private sphere wherein it
tolerates violence.
A. Girard's Theory of Violence
Girard tackles the question of what role sacrifice plays in primitive
societies.45 For Girard, the fundamental social interaction is rivalry or, as
he deems it, "mimetic desire. 46 The objects that society tends to see as the
causes of violence-scarce resources, for instance-are merely attractive
nuisances distracting attention from the real source, our rivals: "[r]ivalry
does not emerge because of the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a
single object; rather, the subject desires the object because the rival desires
it."47 More and more individuals, exposed to this rivalrous dynamic, will
be sucked into it through their own mimetic desire, hence the phenomenon
will snowball. Rivalry is therefore both contagious and self-replicating.
Thus, "[tlhe slightest outbreak of violence can bring about a catastrophic
escalation.
4 8
According to Girard, primitive societies lack a legal system, so they
have few effective ways of dealing with the inevitable outbreak of chaotic
violence. 49  Rather than secular laws, these primitive societies turn to
religion to provide a framework for dealing with violence:
In primitive societies the risk of unleashed violence is so
great and the cure [ever-expanding vengeance] so problematic
that the emphasis naturally falls on prevention. The
preventative measures naturally fall within the domain of
religion, where they can on occasion assume a violent
character. Violence and the sacred are inseparable.5 °
For Girard, this religious framework means ritualistic violence,
namely, sacrifice. 51 Since "only violence can put an end to violence, ' 52 the
chaotic violence, rather than being quelled, must be channeled into a
45 See GIRARD, supra note 20, at 6-8, 21-22.
461 d. at 146.
47 Id. at 145 (emphasis in original).
41 _d. at 30.
491d. at 18-19.
0 Id. at 19.
51 Id. at 18.
52Id. at26.
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sacrificial "surrogate victim." 53 In destroying this scapegoat, society views
itself as destroying both the source of the disorder and its own salvation;
hence, the scapegoat, orpharmakos,54 takes on a dual role:
On the one hand he is a woebegone figure, an object of scorn
who is also weighed down with guilt; a butt for all sorts of
gibes, insults, and of course, outbursts of violence. On the
other hand, we find him surrounded by a quasi-religious aura
of veneration; he has become a sort of cult object. This
duality reflects the metamorphosis the ritual victim is
designed to effect; the victim draws to itself all the violence
infecting the original victim and through its own death
transforms this baneful violence into beneficial violence, into
harmony and abundance.55
The perfect victim is both an insider and an outsider, or liminally
transformed from one into the other.56  In this transitional state, the
scapegoat is sacred. In a classic account of ritual symbolism that aligns
with Girard's theory, Victor Turner maintains that ritual honors the social
order by inverting it:
What is interesting about liminal phenomena ... is the blend
they offer of lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and
comradeship. We are presented, in such rites, with a
''moment in and out of time," and in and out of secular social
structure, which reveals, however fleetingly, some
recognition (in symbol if not always in language) of a
generalized social bond that has ceased to be and has
51 Id. at 79.
54 Id. at 95. Girard uses a variation on the classical Greek word pharmakon,
which "means both poison and the antidote for poison, both sickness and cure-in short,
any substance capable of perpetrating a very good or very bad action .... " Id. The
scapegoat, like Homer Simpson's alcohol, is "the cause of, and solution to, all of life's
problems." The Simpsons: Homer vs. the Eighteenth Amendment (Fox television
broadcast Mar. 16, 1997).
55 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 95.
6 Id. at 270-72.
5 See id. at 270-71 (comparing victims of violence to ritual sacrifice victims
such as animal and outsiders).
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simultaneously yet to be fragmented into a multiplicity of
structural ties.
58
Girard's vision is the same as Turner's: through one final act of ordered
violence, the disordered violence ceases.
The essential move here is channeling violence into what society
deems a more palatable direction. The scapegoat serves as a container for
wider social violence. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, in interpreting Girard's theory,
revealed that contain here represents both its ordinary definitions.
59
Webster's Dictionary notes that contain means both "to keep within limits,
as restrain, control, check, [or] halt," and "to have within, hold, comprise,
[or] include." 60  According to Dupuy, the act of sacrifice "contains
disorder, in both senses of the word 'contain': it has within itself, and it
holds it back."
6 1
B. Applying the Model to Domestic Violence
Society, dominated by men, has erected a wall between the public
and the private, and it considers violence in the former significantly more
dangerous, blameworthy, and unbearable than violence in the latter.62 It is
easy for men to take this view, as feminists like West and MacKinnon have
noted, because they tend not to be the victims of violence in the private
sphere.
63
But the Girardian model goes further. To Girard, society opts to
tolerate ordered violence because of the belief that it might mitigate
disordered violence. In this model, the private sphere provides the needed
order: private violence is ideally limited geographically (to within or
around the home) 64 and temporally (to those times at which the abuser and
58 VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE
96 (Aldine 1995) (1966).
59 See Jean-Pierre Dupuy, The Seif-deconstruction of the Liberal Order, 2
CONTAGION 1, 13-14 (1995) (discussing the liberal order's containment of disorder).
60 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (1 1th ed. 2004) (internal
examples and punctuation omitted).
61 Dupuy, supra note 59, at 14.
62 See supra Part It.
63 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMIIY VIOL ENCE STATISTICS
INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 22 tbl.4.1 1 (2005)
("Females were 84% of spouse abuse victims and 86% of victims of abuse at the hands of
a boyfriend or girlfriend.").
64 The Myers case is unusual among domestic-violence incidents because it
occurred in the street; theorists could quibble over whether it remains a true private
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victim are together), and it selects its victims from a limited pool
(sometimes children, usually wives or partners, and almost always women).
Hence, society tolerates private violence because it views the private sphere
as an outlet, a container for violence. Male dominance and violence in the
home will stave off violent disorder in the streets.
Some empirical evidence supports this intuition. Neil Jacobson and
John Gottman's study of the different types of batterers suggests that at
least one group, which they dub "Cobras," is comprised of antisocial and
potentially psychopathic men who tend to have criminal records and view
violence in the home as a means to gratification in life. 65 Viewing this
group of men through a Girardian framework, one could infer that these
men might, but for the fortuitous circumstance of having an intimate victim
to manipulate within the private, commit greater violence in the public
sphere. The findings of other psychologists suggest that frustrated weaker
men, dominated by stronger men in the public sphere, might turn to the
private sphere to let out their aggression.
66
Also implicit in this model is the concept of home as sacred ground,
a strange location that is both a place of tension and a haven from the
outside world. Like Girard's sacrificial act, the violent marital home
encompasses both transgression and a curb on wider disorder. Its
inhabitant, the wife or female intimate partner, is the scapegoat. On the one
hand, her batterer views her as the vile source of frustration, tension, and
violence. As Barbara Ehrenreich noted of the Playboy revolution of the
1950s, men may perceive wives as carping crushers of spirit, domineering
deprivers of freedom, and money-grubbing demanders of their share of
men's own good life.67 On the other hand, the wife is simultaneously
sacred in the transition she provides from disorder to order, from chaos to
haven, even if her role is that of victim. 68 Jacobson and Gottman noted that
violence case at all.
65 NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOi IMAN, WHEN MEN BAI TER WOMEN: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 36-39 (1998).
66 See generally Kristin L. Anderson & Debra Umberson, Gendering Violence.
Masculinity and Power in Men's Accounts of Domestic Violence, 15 GENDER & SOC'Y
358, 359, 372 (2001) (demonstrating that male abusers often use domestic violence as a
way of establishing the masculine dominance they otherwise feel is threatened in
society).
67 BARBARA EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE
FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT 42-47 (1983); see also Anderson & Umberson, supra note
66, at 367-68 (discussing batterers' accounts of their female partners as controlling): id.
at 371 (recounting some batterers' resentment toward a perceived cultural bias against
men).
68 Wrapped up in this dichotomy of views of marriage and womanhood is,
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the more numerous type of batterers, "Pit Bulls," are "motivated by a fear
of being left" and thus desperately cling to their wives; 69 their jealous rage
is almost a form of worship.
70
The fact that modern society has developed a complex, legalized
social structure does not necessarily mean it has escaped the Girardian
model for ritualistic violence. Girard stresses that even advanced and
secular societies are rooted in primitive ones, and that law is the
continuation of ritual by other means: "Even when this theology disappears,
as has happened in our culture, the transcendental quality of the system
remains intact. Centuries can pass before men realize that there is no real
difference between their principle of justice and the concept of revenge."
71
IV. PRIVATE VIOLENCE AND FEMINISM
The Girardian model of ritual violence, translated into the modern
concept of private violence, has important implications for the work of
feminist legal theorists. There are three basic areas in which this newly
applied concept can have an impact: in transforming women from
scapegoats into regular members of society, in transforming gendered
dominance of the private sphere to protect against reciprocal violence, and
in transforming the law governing domestic violence to address the public-
undoubtedly, a dual view of sexuality and procreation as both sinful and sacred. See,
e.g., ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 26 27 (Vintage Books 1989)
(1988) (discussing Christian conceptions of marriage, celibacy, and sexual intercourse).
American society, though efficient at translating religious values into secular morality,
has nevertheless been shaped by monotheistic, particularly Protestant Christian, ideas of
the proper relationship between men and women. See, e.g., NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE,
THE SCARLET LETTER (4th rev. ed., Norton 2004) (1850) (exploring themes of
Puritanism and sexuality in early America); Gail Bedernan, "The Women Have Had
Charge of the Church Work Long Enough ": The Men and Religion Forward Movement
of 1911 1912 and the Masculinization of Middle-Class Protestantism, in A MIGHTY
BAPTISM: RACE, GENDER, AND THE CREATION OF AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 107
(Susan Juster & Lisa MacFarlane eds., 1996) (discussing the influence of religion on
American gender roles through the lens of an early-twentieth-century movement).
Though these ideas may be inexorably intertwined with men's double perspective on
their wives, I leave discussion of their implications to another time.
69 JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 65, at 36-39.
'o Think here of Marion Brando as Stanley Kowalski in a stained undershirt
crying "STELLAIH H!!!" outside his New Orleans apartment to the wife he just struck
in A Streetcar Named Desire (Warner Bros. 1951).
71 Girard, supra note 20, at 23 24.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss1/5
VIOLENCE AND THE PRIKA TE
private divide. Ultimately, the Girardian framework provides a built-in
solution to the violence which it defines as a central societal problem.
72
A. Transforming Scapegoats
I have argued in the preceding pages that part of the problem with
society's treatment of domestic violence is that it views the victims-
overwhelmingly women-as Girardian scapegoats. Here, I maintain that
this treatment is rooted in a view of women as fundamentally different from
men, an out-group living amongst (or within) the in-group. This state of
affairs may be all the more true, as critical race feminists point out, for
women of color. The problem of the woman as scapegoat calls for a
wholly revolutionary solution: society must reconceptualize the differences
it now views as gendered into variations among men and women rather
than between them.
One strand of feminist legal theorists posits that women are
different, perhaps essentially so, from men. Scholars like Carol Gilligan
73
and Robin West 74 have argued that differences in psychology and
experiences give women a distinct outlook on human interactions. Critical
race feminists like Angela Harris go even further, arguing that other
distinctions, particularly race and class, impact women's experiences and
75worldviews. The hypothesis derived from the theories of Girard and, to a
lesser extent, Turner, which postulates that differences permit scapegoating,
can provide a causal explanation for violence against women consistent
with these difference-focused feminists' views.
Carol Gilligan focuses on males' and females' different strategies for
evaluating moral quandaries. 76 In one passage of her 1982 psychological
critique, In a Different Voice, Gilligan examines the responses of two
young people, a boy and a girl, to a hypothetical moral dilemma. 77 The boy
evaluates the problem through logical rules, while the girl approaches it
through a framework of relationships and caring, a distinction that leads the
72 See infra Section IV.B.
73 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENI VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 25-29 (Harvard Univ. Press 1982).
74 See generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women ' Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140
(1987).
15 See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
76 CAROl GiLIlGAN, supra note 73, at 25.
77 Id. at 25 29.
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original psychological appraiser to score the boy more highly. 78  The
problem, Gilligan suggests, isn't that the girl's answers are normatively
worse, but that the entire psychological process, from interview to
evaluation, fails to appreciate their validity: "while [the boy's] assumptions
about agreement are confirmed by the convergence in logic between his
answers and the questions posed, her assumptions are belied by the failure
of communication, the interviewer's inability to understand her response.
79
Unlike Gilligan, West directly confronts feminist legal theory, in
particular liberal and radical conceptions of its goal. West argues that,
while both male and female social conceptions value autonomy, the
collective subjective experience of women effectively lacks autonomy as
biology forces, and society conditions, women to be giving.80  Women,
West argues, are fundamentally different from men because their
experience is fundamentally different. 8 1 This difference, which West, with
shades of Gilligan, considers a "relational" rather than "autonomous" sense
of being, 82 essentially dictates that women cannot truly consent within
relationships. at least in any liberal sense of the word. 83 In the specific
context of domestic violence, persistent fear of the batterer forces women to
abandon autonomy in favor of emphasis on and concern for the batterer:
"the near universal response to the pervasive fear with which a battered
woman lives is to redefine herself as a giving rather than a liberal self."
84
This lack of autonomy may even result in women no longer fitting within
society's problematic definition of human being.
8 5
These types of differences make women perfect victims for
Girardian sacrifice. Women are an out-group amongst the in-group,
perhaps discrete but not insular. Their different worldviews and
experiences allow them to easily be branded outsiders while simultaneously
remaining ostensibly members of society. This dangerous contradiction is
what makes women fit the scapegoat archetype. For Girard, the scapegoat,
78 id.
79 Id. at 29. For a discussion of various scholars" critiques of Gilligan and
alternate explanations for the seemingly gendered outcomes, see Bridget J. Crawford, The
Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3
PiTT. TAX REV. 1, 41 n.202 (2005), and sources cited therein.
80 West, supra note 74, at 140.
8 Id. at 142.
82 Id.; cf GilLIIGAN, supra note 73, at 25-29 (contrasting a masculine, rigid,
"rational" set of ethics with a relational, feminine "ethic of care").
83 West, supra note 74, at 93-94.
84 Id. at 99 (emphasis omitted).
85 See id. at 142 ("[F]eminists should insist on women's humanity ... and on the
wrongness of the dominant conception of what it means to be a 'human being.").
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or "surrogate victim," is not "simply foreign to the community. Rather, he
is seen as a 'monstrous double.' He partakes of all possible differences
within the community, particularly the differences between within and
without .... Thus, the surrogate victim constitutes both a link and a barrier
between the community and the sacred. '86  Because of women's
simultaneous sameness and difference, they are marginalized, liminal in the
Girard-Turner sense, and hence prime candidates for sacrificial victims.
8 7
Angela Harris's critique of gender essentialism adds a layer of
complexity to the Gilligan and West difference theories, as Harris combines
her feminist examination with one incorporating issues of race. To Harris,
"the experience of black women is too often ignored in both feminist theory
and in legal theory, and gender essentialism in feminist legal theory does
nothing to address this problem."88  Indeed, situating gender as a
fundamental category of different experience, as West does, "reduce[s] the
lives of people who experience multiple forms of oppression [such as
sexism and racism] to addition problems," 89 when in reality "the self of a
woman of color is not primarily a female self or a colored self, but a both-
and self."90 Gender essentialism further allows latent racism to creep into
the feminist legal discourse.9 1 But Harris's theory inevitably leads to the
same problems for sacrificial violence as the premise it disavows.
Harris's solution isn't the obliteration of categories of oppression,
,92but "mak[ing] our categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable."
Yet in the Girardian view, unstable and tentative differences are at the very
core of the liminality that allows society to identify scapegoats. 93  For
Girard and Turner, Harris's form of difference would emphasize the
liminal, and therefore dangerous, status of women, women of color, and
other groups oppressed by private violence. The increased liminality of
these categories would only enhance women's susceptibility to violence as
a sacrificial entity. While Harris's diagnosis may be more complex than
86 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 271.
87 Compare id. ("[R]itual victims tend to be drawn from categories that are
neither outside nor inside the community, but marginal to it: slaves, children, livestock.")
with TURNER, supra note 58, at 125 ("[Liminal sacrificial victims] all have this common
characteristic: they are persons or principles that (1) fall in the interstices of social
structure, (2) are on its margins, or (3) occupy its lowest rungs.").
88 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. RFV. 581, 585 (1990).
89 1d. at 588.
90 1d. at 604.
91 See Id. at 589 (discussing the practical advantages of feminist essentialism).
92 Id.at 586.
9' GIRARD, supra note 20, at 271.
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essentialist difference feminists like Gilligan and West, the Girardian
perspective suggests the cure is worse than the disease.
Linda Ammons has a different notion of the oppressive experience
of women of color from that of Harris-one that effectively anticipates, at
least for African American women, the problem that social scapegoating
poses for combating domestic violence.94 Ammons believes that African
American women are disadvantaged as battered-woman defendants in
spouse murder trials. 95 Her theory is based on the premise that many of
society's stereotypes of black women run counter to stereotypes of women
96in general. Stereotypes of black women include "Mammy, Aunt Jemima,
and Jezebel," and more recently "Sapphire, the matriarch, and the welfare
queen." 97  Though these are in many respects negative depictions of
African American women, vulnerable they are not. 98 The conception that
these black female stereotypes are not vulnerable like women in general,
with the white woman as the archetype works against social acceptance of
a claim that they can be victims of domestic violence.
99
Society's view of black women as nonvictims does not result in
them being any less victimized; like all women, they remain actually
vulnerable to violence in the private sphere. °° Stereotypes of black women
as nonvulnerable cannot eliminate them as scapegoat candidates. To be
scapegoats, according to the Girardian scheme, they need only be different;
vulnerability is just another dimension of difference, not a special
protection against scapegoating. Indeed, if society views black women as
different from men because they are, first, women and, second, different
from other women because they are not vulnerable, these compound
94 See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery,
and Stereotypes: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, in
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 261 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(analyzing the use of battered woman syndrome in criminal law and its effect on black
women).
95 Id. at 261.
96 id.
9' Id. at 264 (internal references omitted).
98 See id. (discussing how negative stereotypes of black women can also convey
their strength and independence).
99 Id. at 264 65.
10 African Americans account for about a quarter of U.S. domestic-violence
victims, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 32, though they comprise
only about 12 percent of the population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY tbl.B02001, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_
bm=y&-geo id=OIOOOUS&-ds name=ACS 2005 EST GOO &-mt name=ACS2005_
ESTG2000_B02001 (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
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differences may create a state of flux mirroring Harris' unstable
categories-that fits the liminal-difference model perfectly.
The only way to avoid this result to prevent women from
becoming scapegoats in private violence because of their differences from
what society views as its own normal members, namely, me--is to
reconceptualize such differences as nongendered variations in a universal,
inclusive humanity. This is, of course, easier said than done. To advance
this goal, the law must begin to treat problems traditionally conceptualized
as belonging only to women as instead affecting all society, not exclusively
women.
101
The shift will largely have to come through identifying and adopting
differences., previously perceived as gender-based, as instead non-gender-
specific variations in the human experience. Any real impact would stem
from a radical change in the norms expressed in those institutions that have
a direct impact on culture, such as education and the media. Social
education, for instance, might permit society to acknowledge the
differences noted by Gilligan, between the logical-rules and relational-
caring approaches to moral dilemmas, without attributing these differences
to gender. Dislodging these distinctions from a conceptual gender divide
would permit social evaluation on a normative basis without loading them
with gender-based judgments and would permit recognition of those
situations in which a man takes the relational approach or a woman the
logical approach without viewing them as deviant. Likewise,
representations in the media that emphasize the concept of gender as a
spectrum, rather than a set of discrete categories that are either stable, as in
West's conception, or unstable, as in Harris's, could, to the extent the
audience accepts them, go a long way toward unraveling the concept of
woman as an inherently different other. 1
02
Because it is conceptual rather than practical, this social shift
presents challenges more difficult that other prescriptions derived from the
Giradian model of domestic violence. A full understanding of what courses
of action would lead to the necessary redefinition of woman requires a more
thorough exploration than the structure of this article allows. Suffice it to
say, the Girardian model's message for feminist legal theory is that society
101 For a further discussion of feminist legal changes as a result of the Girardian
concept of ritual violence, see inJra Part 1V.C.
102 See, e.g., Surya Monro, Beyond Male and Female: Poststructuralism and the
Spectrum of Gender, 8 INT'l, J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 3 (2005) (conceptualizing gender
as a spectrum based on research with transgender identities).
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must deemphasize the perceived gender differences that have thus far left
women open to being viewed as scapegoats.
Many feminists West in particular, but likely Harris as well
would question whether the category woman, freed of the differences
derived from gender-specific examination, would retain any meaning
whatsoever. But if accepting women alongside of men under the
conceptual definition of person, with differences at the individual rather
than categorical level, is necessary to eliminate the liminality that permits
society to treat women as scapegoats, perhaps the aggregate benefits are
worth the cost.
B. Transforming Domination
In addition to a redefinition of woman, the Girardian understanding
of domestic violence challenges society to undertake a redefinition of
private-or at least abandon the distinction between private and public
violence. In light of this model, society uses the concept of domination to
provide structure to the distinction between the private and public,
attempting to create a closed private space where hierarchical or
dominating violence may stave off chaotic violence in the public. Yet
domination is ineffective at this task: violence, no matter the channel
through which it is directed, begets more violence. Domination is less
about the relationship between men and women-merely a mechanism by
which societal violence is funneled and more about the relationship
between violence and mankind, a relationship society must transform to
forestall all forms of violence.
Catharine MacKinnon's contribution to the feminist legal discourse
is focusing the legal issue on a narrative of dominance. MacKinnon argues
that the fundamental dynamic between men and women is the former
dominating the latter, and that society has structurally accepted this through
legal fictions that ignore the plight of women. 103 For instance, if the legal
regime "defines rape as intercourse with force or coercion and without
consent," its premise is that intercourse with force or coercion but not
without consent is permissible sex.10 4  This presents an odd set of
equivalencies: "dominance plus submission [equals] force plus consent,"
which "equals sex, not rape.'' 10 5 If a man dominates, as men are wont to do,
and a woman accepts that domination, according to a male standard of what
103 See MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 172.
11
4 Id. at 172.
105 id.
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acceptance looks like, the act is protected. The structure thus preserves
domination itself as a legitimate dynamic.
In MacKinnon's view, this perverse outcome of legitimized
domination is no less likely in the domestic-violence arena than in that of
rape. 106 In domestic violence, the legal mechanism that preserves such
domination is not the fictive consent of the rape scheme but the
proliferation of the private sphere. 07 The private sphere is "man's
sovereign castle, where most women remain for a lifetime, where women
are mostly to be battered and sexually assaulted, and where they have no
recourse because the private, by definition, is inviolable and recourse
means intervention. ' 108 MacKinnon's solution is to get women out of the
home and thus out of the private sphere and into the public sphere,
where women have "freedom of action, resources, and access to a larger
world," and are "most equal" with men.10 9 For MacKinnon, freedom and
equality keep score in a zero-sum game between men and women, and
since "men have the most freedom at home, . . . women gain
correspondingly greater equality, hence freedom, the farther away from
home they go.""10 In her argument in favor of the Violence Against
Women Act, MacKinnon envisions women seeking legal redress from the
federal government as opposed to the state because the federal government
is conceptually (and likely geographically) further from the male-
dominated home. "'1
MacKinnon and others have identified how the private sphere
disadvantages women, and the Girardian model explains why society has
nevertheless preserved and defended it as a site for sacrificial violence
alienated from the public. 112 The intuition is clear: dominance of one clear
category of people over another means hierarchy and order, and ordered
violence within such a hierarchy is necessary to stave off disordered
violence. But even as it establishes the model for private violence as a
container for chaotic violence, Girard's theory provides the solution to
unraveling the premise that dominance is necessary.
106 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 237 (2005)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES].
'0' Id. at 236-37.
... Id. at 237.
109 Id.
110 Id.; see also Anderson & Umberson, supra note 66, at 369-71 (discussing
abusers' accounts of what they perceived as systemic bias in the legal system in favor of
women).
III MACKiNNoN, WOMFN'S LIVES, supra note 106, at 238.
112 See supra Part IlI.B.
2007-2008]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
124 UX-r. OF PEV S7LT:1L JOURIVAL OFL 1W 'ND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 11
One of Girard's central arguments is that controlled sacrificial
violence may keep chaotic violence at bay.113 This establishes the basis for
the concept of the private sphere in modem society as a place for ritual,
tolerable, and "good" violence that can prevent "bad" violence. But
another of Girard's essential arguments may undermine that justification:
violence is reciprocal, contagious, and self-replicating-in short,
unavoidable. 114
Girard claims that "[v]iolence is like a raging fire that feeds on the
very objects intended to smother its flames" because, "[t]he more men
strive to curb their violent impulses, the more these impulses seem to
prosper."1 5 Though sacrifice serves as an attempt to contain violence
through order, it remains merely an attempt: "Inevitably the moment comes
when violence can only be countered by more violence. Whether we fail or
succeed in our effort to subdue it, the real victor is always violence
itself"' 1 6  Throughout his account, Girard refrains from normatively
judging the structure of sacrifice as pertains to its goal of alleviating
violence, instead methodically placing scare quotes around the "good" in
"'good' violence."' 117 Girard merely describes what societies think they are
accomplishing when they undertake sacrificial rites in the midst of chaotic
violence; he never claims they actually achieve anything.
Much scientific knowledge of the nature of domestic violence
suggests that the proposition that violence begets violence carries the day.
Though, as noted in Part II.B, one might expect that the opportunity for
private violence would assuage the tendency of Jacobson and Gottman's
"Cobras" to commit violence outside the home, in fact 44 percent of them
have histories of violence outside the home. 118 Both Cobras and Pit Bulls
were much more likely to come from violent childhood households than the
general population1 19 further suggesting that earlier violence made them
the violent people they would later become. Additional research has shown
that those who follow the conventional self-help book wisdom and "blow
off steam" when they are angry by hitting a punching bag subsequently act
and feel more, not less, aggressive.
120
13 See supra Part I1.
114 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 30.
"' Id. at 31.
116 'd.
117 See id. passim.
118 JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 65, at 93-97.
1 9 Id. at 94.
120 Brad J. Bushman, Does Venting Anger Feed or Extinguish the Flame?
Catharsis, Rumination, Distraction, Anger, and Aggressive Responding, 28
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This evidence, understood through the Girardian framework of
reciprocal violence, indicates that society's attempts to stave off public
violence through tolerance of private violence are at best futile and at worst
completely counterproductive. Violence in any form, however ordered,
however private, will lead to more aggression and more violence
throughout all domains. The outlook that violence is inevitable may be
bleak, but the practical course of action is clear: rather than, as MacKinnon
suggests, distinguishing the private as a province of male domination and
the public as a haven of legal redress for women, 12 1 society must focus on
stamping out violence wherever it occurs. Orderly male dominance in the
private sphere may increase disorderly violence in public, and it certainly
does nothing to alleviate it. Since Girard's account of the nature of
violence lends credence to MacKinnon's call for addressing the male
dominance hierarchy through legal changes, this theoretical underpinning is
further emphasized when Girard addresses the MacKinnon argument in its
own terms: "[v]iolence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred," which
"consists of all those forces whose dominance over man increases or seems
to increase in proportion to man's effort to master them."' 122 The Girardian
model includes a call to arms, a challenge to recognize that domination is
not a solution to chaotic violence but a manifestation of it. In other words,
as men attempt to dominate women through violence, violence dominates
men.
C Transforming Law
The Girardian model of private violence finally counsels in favor of
a legal pragmatist approach to the problem of private violence. Pragmatic
feminists believe in the ability to work for change within the existing legal
framework, challenging laws piece by piece. Girard developed a concept of
law as a replacement for sacrifice, a higher social order to do the work that
channeled violence had previously been aimed at doing. The law has thus
far been problematic, preserving domestic violence first through
chastisement and ultimately through the public-private dichotomy. But
law, as pragmatic feminists may recognize, is the ultimate tool for
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 724, 724 (2002); see also JACOBSON &
GOTTMAN, supra note 65, at 725 ("[T]he activation of aggressive thoughts can engender
a complex of associations consisting of aggressive ideas, emotions related to violence,
and the impetus for aggressive actions.").
121 MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 106, at 237-38; see supra text
accompanying notes 109-10.
122 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 31.
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exploding that dichotomy, bringing private tragedies into the public light
and leveling the field for victims of all violence.
Over the past few decades, those feminist legal theorists who have
adopted a pragmatic, realistic approach to transforming law have
effectuated the most concrete results. While philosophically abstract
theorists have influenced legal discourse, erasure of Ruth Bader Ginsburg
from legal history would impact the outcomes of landmark cases and law
school classes significantly more than a similar removal of MacKinnon or
Harris. 123
Ginsburg defends the legal goal of formal equality from those
theorists, particularly Gilligan or MacKinnon, who might attack it as
essentially a capitulation, an agreement to fight men on men's own terms
and resulting in, at best, a victory for women willing to act like men.124 In
the 1970s, Supreme Court sex-discrimination cases, many of which
Ginsburg played a role in, strove "to obtain thoughtful consideration of the
assumptions underlying, and the purposes served by, sex-based
classifications.'" 125  For Ginsburg, making the law gender-neutral
eliminating those instances where the law, on its face, treats men and
women differently, especially and most frequently subordinating women
was both an important step toward true legal equality and, practically
speaking, all that could have been done in the 1970s. 1
26
The academic counterpart of Ginsburg on the bench and at the bar is
Margaret Jane Radin. To Radin, feminism should be, and largely is, a
pragmatist's endeavor. 127 Radin argues that feminist legal theorists, caught
in a "double bind," must make choices in the context of "nonideal justice:
given where we now find ourselves, what is the better decision?"' 128 This
means "confront[ing] each dilemma separately and choos[ing] the
alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the
... As an advocate for the ACLU Women's Rights Project, Ginsburg argued
several cases before the Supreme Court, including Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), establishing the level of scrutiny for
gender-based equal-protection claims. As a Supreme Court Justice, she wrote for the
majority in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), holding the Virginia Military
Institute's policy of admitting only men unconstitutional.
124 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist
Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17 (discussing successes achieved
in utilizing the court structure to further goals of equality as answer to critics).
121 Id. at 16.
126 Id. at 17-18.
127 Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699, 1707 (1990).
..8 Id. at 1700.
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most. ' 129 One way to "hammer[] out [truth] piecemeal in the crucible of
life and ...situatedness" is to dissolve "traditional dichotomies" such as
that between "public (man) and private (woman)," a specific rejection that
Radin suggests pragmatists have not yet adopted, but should. 30
To pragmatic legal feminists the Girardian model offers a vision of
the functions for which society depends on law. Girard argues that law is
rooted in ritual; the development of the modem legal system is an efficient,
secular version of the ritual system of order containing violence. 131 Law is
more effective than sacrifice because, whereas sacrifice must designate a
surrogate victim in order to quell a widening cycle of vengeance, law
makes sure "violence does indeed fall on the 'right' victim . . .with such
force, such resounding authority, that no retort is possible."' 132 This is
clearly more just than the sacrificial system, but then justice is not a value
by which ritual sacrifice measures its success.133
Girard's concept of law focuses on criminal law, but its implications
spill over into legal theory as well. All law, according to the model, springs
from ritualized violence as an extended attempt to systematize rules and
procedures for ordering society. 134 This requires instilling a judicial system
with overwhelming authority, a "monopoly on the means of revenge" so
authoritative "no group, not even the collectivity as a body, can challenge"
it.135 This makes the modern legal system potentially dangerous: "like all
modern technological advances, it is a two-edged sword, which can be used
to oppress as well as to liberate."
' 136
Each of those two edges comes into play in the creation and
preservation of the divide between the public and private spheres. In
theory, the division is a means of liberating the community from chaotic
violence by channeling violence into a realm of order; in practice, this
dichotomy oppresses the community's sacrificial scapegoats, victims of
domestic violence, through a system of domination and tolerance thereof.
Like Radin, Girard believes that a fundamental problem for society's
victims is that they are caught in a double bind: they are expected to
simultaneously follow the lead of their model "others" and refrain from
"'9/d. at 1704.
"Ol1d. at 1707 08.
131 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 23-24.
131 Id. at 22.
133 id.
134 See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
135 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 23.
136 id.
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following because they are different. 137 Girard argues that the only escape
is "channeling . . . energies into ritual forms."' 138  If the modern, more
effective corollary to ritual is the law, it follows that the law itself is where
victims of the double bind must turn. The paradox this presents in the
domestic-violence context is that law is both the source of the problem
the private-public divide-and its solution.
The guidance that this theory provides for pragmatic feminists
demands using the law's universal liberating aspects to overcome and
demolish its more oppressive structures. Law may have served to preserve
the public-private divide, but it has also provided justice for victims of
violent criminals. The Girardian model thus supports using Radin's
piecemeal system of relative outcomes to chisel away at the dominant
dichotomy through utilization of the criminal justice system. For instance,
laws that make prosecution of domestic-violence offenders mandatory even
in the face of objections from the battered victim 139 are preferable to those
policies advocating nonprosecutorial resolutions to domestic disputes, as
revealed in Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Department,140 and Brown v.
Grabowski.141 These latter policies preserve the private sphere of violence
by treating it as a separate and less criminal problem than public
violence.
The Girardian model also suggests that Ginsburg is right in
advocating that feminists go further and effect reform of the legal system
from within through both litigation and legislation. If making the law
"' Id. at 147-49. For Girard, this specifically refers to the mimetic problem that
rivals command one another to both imitate them and avoid imitating them. See id. at
147 ("Man cannot respond to that universal human injunction, 'Imitate me!' without
almost immediately encountering an inexplicable counterorder: 'Don't imitate me!'
(which really means, do not appropriate my object). This second command fills man with
despair and turns him into the slave of an involuntary tyrant."); cf id. at 178 (comparing
the mimetic double bind to the Freudian expectation to both model oneself after one's
father and refrain from doing those things that are solely within the province of the
father). For Radin, it refers to social demands that women both prostitute themselves in
order to gain some economic autonomy over their bodies (and thus be more equal with
men) and shun prostitution as an ugly commodification of the sacred (because their
bodies are different and special). See Radin, supra note 126, at 1700.
138 GIRARD, supra note 20, at 149.
139 See Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good
Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1999) (discussing of the
efficacy of so-called no-drop prosecution policies and an equal-protection argument for
their adoption).
140 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).
141 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990). For a discussion of Brown and Hynson, see
supra text accompanying notes 33 38.
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formally neutral toward gender was a significant first step in accomplishing
practical legal feminist goals, the logical next step, as Ginsburg implies, is
extending that neutrality to those laws that are discriminatory in more
insidious ways. 142  Among these are legal structures that wield in
oppressive ways the authority granted to government to resolve social
problems, namely, structures that preserve the private sphere. The model
suggests, then, that society should purge laws treating crimes and wrongs
that occur in private as private matters. It should further enact laws, in the
criminal and tort fields, that set private wrongs on an equal footing with
public wrongs. That an act of violence plays out between a husband and
wife and within the walls of a house doesn't make the act any less
damaging to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite advances from the days of chastisement, society continues to
treat domestic violence as something different. and more private, than other
forms of violence. Application of Girard's theory of ritual violence is one
way of explaining the philosophy behind this maneuver: society channels
violence into an orderly container, in this case the private sphere, on the
premise that the sacrifice will stave off chaotic public violence. Yet the
Girardian model also provides tools feminist legal theorists may use to
overcome the poor outcomes the domestic-violence-maintaining private
realm affords women. Society's reliance on Girard's framework as a
justification is inherently faulty because privatizing violence is not an
effective measure for preventing public violence in a modern social order.
The current task is for social and legal reformers to prevent women from
becoming scapegoats, to alleviate the dominating effects of rampant
violence, and to restrain those features of the legal system that effectuate
the private sphere while emphasizing those that treat violence as a universal
problem. The problem of domestic violence, which society has conceived
of as a private matter, will have to get public.
142 See Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 124, at 18 ("Once the law books have been
cleared of prescriptions of the kind [the sex-discrimination plaintiffs of the 1970s]
challenged, what should one strive to enact instead?").
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